Genocide Solution · Institutions
Global Institutions
Every international institution the Genocide Plan works through to stop the genocides in Palestine, Sudan, Myanmar and East Turkistan and India's persecution of its Muslims. Each one is judged on whether it can still be moved against the perpetrators or has been captured by those who shield them, with the record behind the verdict.
How each institution is judged
Captured: a state or bloc that arms or shields a perpetrator can veto, block or steer the institution's decisions on these cases, or the institution has been coerced into silence — its officials sanctioned, its funding cut — or it is itself a party to the trade or the war.
Movable: it still decides by majority or through independent officers, and its recent record shows it acting against the perpetrators, so pressure from the plan's coalition can move it further.
A verdict is about these five cases only, and is drawn from the referenced record. Each card says what is left to work with.
OIC and Muslim-majority states
In the plan: Provides the collective Muslim states' decisions, bloc votes and funding that the compact, the funds and the court cases draw on, even though it cannot bind its members.
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)
CapturedThe OIC decides by consensus, so any member can block it. Saudi Arabia hosts it in Jeddah and is its largest funder. The UAE, accused by Sudan and by UN investigators of arming the RSF, kept its ambassador and its ties with Israel through the Gaza war. Saudi Arabia and the UAE were among the 37 states that signed the July 2019 letter backing China’s Xinjiang policy. The OIC’s own statements show the result. On El Fasher, in October 2025, it condemned the violations but named no outside supplier. The September 2025 joint Arab-Islamic emergency summit in Doha only recommended sanctions on Israel. In 2019 the OIC’s foreign ministers commended China’s treatment of its Muslims.
What is left: Member states using its platform where no powerful member shields the perpetrator. The Gambia’s genocide case against Myanmar, which the OIC backs and which reached merits hearings in January 2026, is the model. On Sudan, Gaza and the Uyghurs the bloc as a whole cannot be moved while the UAE and Saudi Arabia can block consensus.
References (5)
- OIC General Secretariat statement on El Fasher
- Saudi Arabia and Russia among 37 states backing China's Xinjiang policy
- UAE plans to maintain ties with Israel despite Gaza outcry, sources say
- Arab, Islamic leaders urge 'review' of Israel ties at emergency summit after Doha strikes
- A Missed Opportunity to Protect Muslims in China
League of Arab States
CapturedThe League decides by consensus, and the states that normalised relations with Israel sit at its table. The joint Arab-Islamic emergency summit in Doha in September 2025 made only recommendations. In September 2026 the League’s ministerial council called for completing the Gaza ceasefire phases and implementing Resolution 2803, and praised the mediators, while Israeli forces were reported to hold about 64% of Gaza. The League has taken no measure of its own against Israel.
What is left: Individual members, such as Qatar, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, turning summit language into national measures. The League itself issues no binding decisions.
Coalition of enforcing states
In the plan: The existing coalition whose Bogotá commitments the new Compact turns into binding national law, with protection against retaliation.
The Hague Group
MovableEight states founded the group in January 2025: Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba, Honduras, Malaysia, Namibia, Senegal and South Africa. In Bogotá in July 2025, twelve states committed to six measures, among them barring arms shipments to Israel and the ships that carry them. At its March 2026 meeting the co-chairs again called for port controls, an end to the transit of arms and military fuel, and a ban on settlement goods. No perpetrator or patron is a member, and it decides among willing states. Few signatories have yet put the port and flag measures into law.
What moves it: Members writing the Bogotá measures into national law. This is exactly the gap the Compact is meant to close.
ICJ, ICC and their states parties
In the plan: Used for legal standing, findings and records: joint filings and evidence feed them, while enforcement is carried by states.
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
MovableThe Court’s judges rule independently, and no veto applies to them. In The Gambia v Myanmar it held merits hearings on 12–29 January 2026 and is deliberating; there is no judgment yet. In South Africa v Israel, Israel filed its counter-memorial, with objections to jurisdiction, on 12 March 2026, and 22 states have filed interventions. Its advisory opinion of 22 October 2025 found that Israel broke international law by shutting down UNRWA’s operations. Israel rejected it. The Court has no enforcement power of its own.
What moves it: A merits judgment in the Myanmar case, and states acting on the Court’s findings. Enforcement through the Security Council is veto-bound.
International Criminal Court (ICC)
MovableThis is the closest call on the page. The United States has sanctioned the Court’s prosecutor and judges. On 24 July 2026, member states voted 82 to 13 to dismiss Prosecutor Karim Khan over misconduct allegations; he denies them and is challenging the vote. Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have begun withdrawing. Still, the US is not a member and holds no veto over the judges, and the chambers still act. In December 2025 they sentenced the Darfur militia leader Ali Kushayb to 20 years. The warrants for Netanyahu and Gallant stand. There is no public decision yet on a warrant for Min Aung Hlaing, and the Court has said his presidency gives him no immunity.
What moves it: The judges’ ruling on Min Aung Hlaing, the choice of a new prosecutor, and states parties arresting the people named in warrants.
Interpol
CapturedInterpol’s rules bar it from the cases that matter here. Article 3 of its constitution forbids any action of a political, military, religious or racial character, so it cannot pursue state officials or armed forces. It has not acted against anyone in any of the five cases. From 2021 to November 2025 its president was a UAE general, Ahmed Naser Al-Raisi, while the UAE was accused of arming the RSF. Its one record on these cases runs the other way: its file commission has had to delete Red Notices that China filed against Uyghurs.
What is left: Little beyond defence. Complaints to its Commission for the Control of Files can still remove notices that persecute victims.
UN human rights and investigative mechanisms
In the plan: Collect and keep the evidence on all five cases, and their mandates are renewed or created at Human Rights Council sessions, where no veto applies.
UN Human Rights Council
MovableThe Council decides by majority and needs no Security Council consent. In March 2026 it adopted a resolution on Israeli settlements by 34 votes to 3; China and India voted in favour. In November 2025 it ordered an investigation into the atrocities around El Fasher (Resolution S-38/1), without a vote. Its Commission of Inquiry found in September 2025 that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, a finding Israel rejects. On the Uyghurs it is captured: in October 2022 China and its allies voted down even a debate on Xinjiang, by 19 votes to 17. The United States left the Council in February 2025.
What moves it: Majority votes that create and renew investigative mandates and send their findings to the courts. On Xinjiang, that majority has still to be won.
OHCHR and the UN Special Rapporteurs
MovableThe independent experts keep reporting despite coercion. The United States sanctioned Special Rapporteur Francesca Albanese in July 2025. A US court blocked the sanctions in May 2026, but they were reimposed on 27 May while the appeal runs. The office’s 2026 budget cut 117 posts, most of them already vacant, and in December 2025 Volker Türk said $90m of its approved budget had not arrived and it was in “survival mode”. It has published nothing new on Xinjiang since its 2022 assessment.
What moves it: Voluntary funding and political cover from states that defend the special procedures.
Myanmar Investigative Mechanism (IIMM) and the Sudan Fact-Finding Mission
MovableThe Human Rights Council created both, so neither depends on the Security Council. The IIMM’s files support The Gambia’s ICJ case, and its February 2026 bulletin says budget cuts are limiting its work. In February 2026 the Sudan mission found that the RSF’s violence in El Fasher bears “the hallmarks of genocide”; neither side cooperated with it. In September 2026 it found reasonable grounds to believe that UAE-based companies and brokers ran weapons to the RSF.
What moves it: Secure funding, and states using the files in national prosecutions and at the ICC and ICJ.
UN political organs
In the plan: The Security Council is veto-bound and is used only for the record. Where the General Assembly can act without a veto, as on credentials and joint statements, it is used.
UN Security Council
CapturedA permanent member shields every perpetrator here. The United States vetoed two Gaza resolutions in 2025, and Resolution 2803 endorsed Washington’s own Gaza plan and its Board of Peace. Russia vetoed a resolution protecting Sudan’s civilians in November 2024. On 8 October 2026, Resolution 2830 only extended the Darfur arms embargo to December, after Russia and China resisted the US push to cover all of Sudan. China and Russia keep Myanmar and Xinjiang off the agenda.
What is left: Only a change of position by a veto-holder. Until then the work moves to the General Assembly and to coalitions of states.
UN General Assembly
MovableNo veto applies in the Assembly. In September 2025 it endorsed the New York Declaration on Palestinian statehood by 142 votes to 10. It asked the ICJ for the UNRWA opinion, and in December 2025 it renewed UNRWA’s mandate to June 2029. Each year its Credentials Committee has deferred the Myanmar junta’s claim to the country’s seat, leaving the envoy of the ousted civilian government in place. Its resolutions do not bind.
What moves it: Two-thirds majorities in emergency special sessions (“Uniting for Peace”), and the Credentials Committee.
UN humanitarian agencies and donors
In the plan: Delivery channels for the zakat and waqf relief to Gaza, Darfur, Chad and the Rohingya camps.
UNRWA
MovableUNRWA is under siege, not steered by Israel. Since 2024, Knesset laws have barred it from operating in Israel, ordered its utilities cut and stripped its immunity, and Israel has seized its East Jerusalem offices. The United States stopped funding it in February 2025. In June 2026 it dismissed 70 Gaza staff after Israeli accusations, saying this did not validate them. The General Assembly renewed its mandate to June 2029, and the ICJ found in October 2025 that closing its operations breaks international law. Christian Saunders has led it ad interim since Philippe Lazzarini’s term ended in March 2026.
What moves it: Funding from Muslim states and zakat funds to replace what was cut, which is the plan’s channel, and holding Israel to the ICJ opinion.
OCHA, WFP and UNHCR
MovableThese agencies are judged on what they decide and report, and that stays their own. The hunger monitor they work with (the IPC) found in July 2026 that 59% of Gazans faced acute food insecurity. What they can deliver is not theirs to decide. Israel controls the crossings: OCHA says Karem Abu Salem is the only one open to UN supplies, and Israel’s High Court upheld the law restricting aid groups’ registration in June 2026. Donors have made the deepest cuts the sector has seen. Rohingya rations in Bangladesh were cut for two-thirds of households in 2026, the lowest tier to $7 a month, with the response 19% funded.
What moves it: Pooled funding from outside the governments that cut it, and access guaranteed by whoever controls the crossings.
European Union institutions
In the plan: Israel's largest market, which Spain, Ireland and Slovenia seek to move to suspension. The Union also sets the standards for its forced-labour ban.
Council of the European Union
CapturedSuspending Israel’s trade concessions needs a qualified majority, and in April 2026 Kaja Kallas said there was no support for it; Germany and Italy, whose votes decide that majority, have not backed it. Suspending the whole Association Agreement, or sanctioning Ben-Gvir and Smotrich, needs unanimity. Hungary blocked even settler sanctions until its new government lifted the veto in May 2026, and the package then agreed covered three settlers and four settler organisations.
What is left: Germany or Italy changing position, which would give the qualified majority for the trade suspension. A European Citizens’ Initiative calling for suspension passed a million signatures in April 2026.
European Commission
MovableIn September 2025 the Commission used its own power of proposal to suspend Israel’s trade concessions, worth about €5.8bn of exports, and to sanction two ministers. The Council has left the proposal stalled since. The Commission also runs the Forced Labour Regulation, which bans goods made with forced labour of any origin from December 2027. Its guidelines came out in June 2026, but its forced-labour risk database is not yet live.
What moves it: Its power to propose, and its choice of which risk areas the forced-labour ban targets first. Xinjiang could be one of them.
ASEAN and Myanmar's regional neighbours
In the plan: The regional bodies that keep the junta isolated and rescue Rohingya boats, supported through Malaysia's and Indonesia's place in both ASEAN and the OIC.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
CapturedASEAN decides by consensus, so members that want to engage the junta can stop anything stronger than isolation. The junta has ignored the Five-Point Consensus since 2021, and Min Aung Hlaing was sworn in as president in April 2026 after a vote ASEAN did not endorse. ASEAN is now moving toward him. In July 2026 it held its first in-person ministers’ meeting with Myanmar since the coup, in Bangkok, and agreed to draw up benchmarks of “demonstrable progress” before its November summit. Min Aung Hlaing is still kept out of leaders’ meetings.
What is left: Malaysia and Indonesia, members of both ASEAN and the OIC, holding the line against normalisation at the November 2026 summit in Manila.
Sudan mediators
In the plan: The truce tracks for Sudan, which the plan presses to exclude any mediator that arms a warring party.
African Union (Peace and Security Council)
MovableSudan has been suspended since the 2021 coup, so neither warring side sits on the Council to block it. In February 2026 the Council refused to lift the suspension despite pressure from Egypt and Algeria. It has told its members not to recognise the RSF’s parallel government. It has also told its sanctions subcommittee to speed up identifying the outside states that arm the two sides; no list has been published. It runs no mediation of its own.
What moves it: Its sanctions subcommittee publishing the outside backers of each side.
IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)
CapturedIGAD decides by consensus, and Sudan’s army, one of the warring parties, rejoined it in February 2026 after Djibouti brokered its return. A party to the war can therefore block anything aimed at it. Its earlier mediation collapsed in 2023, when the army boycotted it and accused its chair, Kenya, of sheltering the RSF; Kenya denies this. IGAD has produced no truce of its own.
What is left: A mediator both sides accept, perhaps Djibouti, which now chairs it. President Ruto of Kenya met General Burhan in May 2026.
The Quad for Sudan (US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt)
CapturedIts members back the two sides. UN investigators and Crisis Group name the UAE as the RSF’s supplier, which the UAE denies, and Saudi Arabia and Egypt are seen as backing the army. General Burhan rejected the Quad’s November 2025 truce because the UAE sits in it. The truce plan did not stop the RSF taking El Fasher in October 2025, and the Quad has delivered no ceasefire since. The US envoy is now pressing a 90-day truce, with talks due in Switzerland on 20–21 October 2026.
What is left: The United States using its leverage over the UAE, or an arms-monitoring mechanism with no patron on it.
Board of Peace and Gaza ceasefire guarantors
In the plan: The ceasefire bodies, which are held to working with UNRWA and to Israeli withdrawal under the agreed terms.
Board of Peace and the International Stabilization Force
CapturedSecurity Council Resolution 2803 set up the Board in November 2025, and Israel’s chief arms supplier runs it: President Trump chairs it, and Rubio, Witkoff, Blair and Kushner sit on its executive board. The UAE, accused of arming the RSF, also has a seat. Palestinians appear only in a separate committee of technocrats under it. Israel can block the Board: on 14 October 2026 it halted the building of the Board’s first base for the stabilisation force in Gaza. Hamas disarmament and Israeli withdrawal, the plan’s next phases, have not begun.
What is left: The mediators Egypt, Qatar and Türkiye, which sit on the Board, and the troop contributors such as Morocco, making their part conditional on the agreed withdrawal.
Patron, supplier and transit states of Sudan's war
In the plan: The UAE and the other suppliers and transit routes of the RSF's war. The plan names them and cuts them off through the Compact rather than relying on their goodwill.
The war’s suppliers and transit routes
CapturedThese states are parties to the war. In September 2026 a UN fact-finding mission found reasonable grounds to believe that UAE-based companies and brokers moved weapons and fighters to the RSF through hubs in Chad, south-east Libya and Bosaso in Puntland, some of it matching equipment exported to the UAE. The UAE denies arming either side. ACLED reports drones and drone technology reaching the army from Egypt, Russia, Iran and Türkiye. The ICJ dismissed Sudan’s case against the UAE in May 2025 for lack of jurisdiction.
What is left: Arms and trade conditions imposed on the patrons by their own suppliers and markets. These are the Compact’s listings, not the patrons’ goodwill.
Multinational firms, shippers and gold markets
In the plan: The commercial carriers of arms, fuel, gold and forced-labour goods, whom the Compact's listings and port denials press to refuse that trade.
Shipping lines and dockworkers (outside the patron states)
MovableIn June 2025, under campaign pressure, Maersk said it would cut ties with businesses linked to West Bank settlements and tighten its screening. It still carries military cargo, including parts for the F-35 supply chain. Its shareholders, where the founding family holds the majority, rejected a ban on arms shipments to Israel. Dockworkers in Morocco and France have refused or delayed ships, and in November 2024 Spain barred two Maersk ships from its ports. The ports the patron states use on Sudan’s routes are covered in the suppliers card above.
What moves it: Dockworkers refusing to handle the cargo, and port states barring the ships.
Gold markets and refiners (Dubai, Switzerland, LBMA)
CapturedThe trade runs through the RSF’s main patron. Swissaid reports that UAE gold imports from Sudan rose from 17 tonnes in 2023 to 29 tonnes in 2024, with 27 tonnes more arriving through Chad and Libya. The EU banned Sudanese gold in July 2026 and Switzerland followed in September, but neither covers gold refined in the UAE. About 93 tonnes of Dubai gold entered Switzerland in the first quarter of 2026. The London Bullion Market Association has taken no action against refiners over Sudanese gold.
What is left: Extending the EU and Swiss bans to gold refined in the UAE, and buyers refusing UAE-refined bars.
Multinational firms named as complicit
MovableFirms move one at a time when they are listed. The UN’s settlements database named 158 companies in September 2025 and dropped Alstom and Opodo, which had pulled out. Francesca Albanese’s July 2025 report named arms, technology and machinery firms; several deny the findings. On 3 August 2026, 43 more companies came under the US ban on goods made with Uyghur forced labour, the largest addition yet. The ban has stopped more than 24,300 shipments.
What moves it: Listing, import bans and exclusion by investors and customers. These work firm by firm.
Islamic Development Bank and investment funds
In the plan: Provides riba-free (interest-free) finance, sukuk (asset-backed certificates) and settlement infrastructure for the funds and the settlement facility.
Islamic Development Bank (IsDB)
CapturedThe bank is controlled by the same states as the OIC. Saudi Arabia holds 23.51% of its capital and the UAE 6%, and Saudi Arabia re-nominated its president, Muhammad Al Jasser, for a second term in June 2026. The bank funds relief, such as aid for Sudanese refugees with UNHCR in 2025. It has never put a condition on a perpetrator or its patron.
What is left: The member states backing the plan funding the two relief funds through the bank’s riba-free instruments without needing its board, or founding the plan’s own settlement facility.
Norway’s Government Pension Fund Global (plan partner)
CapturedThis fund has been coerced into silence. In August 2025 it sold its stakes in Caterpillar and five Israeli banks on ethical grounds. In November 2025 Norway’s parliament voted 85 to 17 to suspend its ethical exclusions, so the fund would not have to sell its US technology holdings. On 15 October 2026 a government committee proposed making exclusion a last resort. It would also strip the ethics council of the power to recommend it, and drop the rule against firms selling arms to states that commit grave breaches of the laws of war.
What is left: The public consultation, which closes on 15 January 2027, and the government’s white paper in spring 2027.
Transnational Muslim scholarly and relief bodies
In the plan: Issue joint rulings and organise Muslim relief, and are brought together in the new independent scholars' council.
Muslim World League
CapturedThe League is based in Mecca and steered by the Saudi state. Its Secretary-General, Mohammad al-Issa, has called Gaza a genocide, but the League has done nothing beyond statements. No statement by it on the Uyghurs has been found.
What is left: Scholars and Muslim communities pressing it to turn statements into action, which has not yet happened.
International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS)
MovableNo state that arms a perpetrator controls the Union. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt have listed it as a terrorist group since 2017. In April 2025 its fatwa committee told Muslim states to intervene in Gaza, blockade Israel and stop supplying it with oil and gas. Egypt’s Grand Mufti rejected the ruling, saying only states may declare jihad. Its record covers Gaza only; it has said little on the other four cases. Its authority is moral: it can compel no one.
What moves it: Rulings on Sudan, Myanmar, the Uyghurs and India, and states and institutions acting on them.
International Islamic Fiqh Academy (OIC)
CapturedThe Academy is an organ of the OIC and acts when OIC members ask it to, so it is bound by the same consensus in which Saudi Arabia and the UAE can block. The published outputs of its 2025 session in Doha contain no ruling on Gaza, Sudan, Myanmar or the Uyghurs. In January 2026 it met Palestine’s envoy about putting into effect its older ruling (Resolution 165) that part of zakat may go to the Palestinians.
What is left: Its zakat ruling for the Palestinians, which the plan’s zakat fund can apply without it. Rulings on the blockade and the arms trade belong to the plan’s independent scholars’ council.
South Asian bilateral mechanisms
In the plan: Bilateral channels where the plan presses for joint verification of nationality instead of pushing Bengali Muslims across the border.
India–Bangladesh border talks (BSF–BGB)
CapturedThe party doing the expelling controls this channel. At the June 2026 border talks in New Delhi, Bangladesh asked India to stop “push-ins” across the border. India says it returns illegal intruders by procedure, and asks Bangladesh to speed up nationality checks. Human Rights Watch has documented Bengali Muslims expelled without due process. India also defies outside tribunals: it rejected the August 2026 arbitration ruling that it could not unilaterally suspend the Indus Waters Treaty.
What is left: Only outside legal and rights pressure, from Human Rights Watch and the UN bodies.