Myanmar: Rohingya Representation and the Federal Future

Summary

Myanmar's shadow government has pledged Rohingya citizenship since 2021, but rival Rohingya factions, a resurgent Arakan Army, and Bangladesh's own diplomacy now all compete to shape what repatriation would actually mean.

What it argues

1. NUG's federal pledge

   Myanmar's National Unity Government has repeatedly promised citizenship, repeal of the 1982 Citizenship Law, and a new birthright-based law. It invites Rohingya to join its 'Spring Revolution' against the military and has pledged their justice and voluntary repatriation. The shadow government ties Rohingya rights to its own bid for legitimacy and recognition.

2. Rival Rohingya platforms

   Alliances claiming to speak for Rohingya have multiplied since 2022 — ARNA, then the ARNC, then a rival Arakan Rohingya National Congress disputing its name. The Rohingya Consultative Council says ARNC's founders broke away rather than submit to its consultative process. Repeated rebranding by the same diaspora figures has left no single body with undisputed legitimacy.

3. Arakan Army's wartime rise

   The Arakan Army now controls most of Rakhine State, leaving Myanmar's military holding only Sittwe and a few positions. Its handover of detained fishermen to Bangladesh's border guard points to emerging border coordination, even as Min Aung Hlaing ties any repatriation to a rollback of international legal cases against Myanmar. Bangladesh's Tarique Rahman put a five-point repatriation plan to the UN in September 2026; Malaysia, China and India are separately weighing their own engagement with Myanmar. Any repatriation now depends on actors Dhaka's diplomacy was not originally built to deal with.

4. 1982 law at the center

   The Citizenship Law excludes Rohingya from Myanmar's 135 recognised 'national races', leaving them stateless. The NUG has pledged repeal, a birthright-based replacement, and abolition of the National Verification Card used to coerce Rohingya. Repeal of the 1982 law remains central to any route to Rohingya citizenship.

5. Accountability and abuse claims

   The ICJ has concluded hearings on The Gambia's genocide case and begun deliberations; the ICC has sought an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlaing; Argentina has issued its own universal-jurisdiction warrants. Min Aung Hlaing wants these processes eased before repatriation, while the UN and Human Rights Watch separately accuse the Arakan Army, now controlling most of Rakhine, of detention, forced recruitment and attacks on Rohingya civilians, which it denies. Both Myanmar's military and its main rival face accountability questions that complicate any return.

6. Funding and camp conditions

   The Rohingya humanitarian funding gap widened to roughly $580 million in 2025, the largest on record, and Bangladesh's 2026 appeal fell sharply short of the year before. Cox's Bazar camps face shortfalls in healthcare, water and livelihoods, while Bhasan Char, housing over 37,000 Rohingya, is criticised as prison-like. Declining funding and worsening camp conditions are straining the response nine years on.

7. Ethnicity recognition unresolved

   Rohingya leaders Nay San Lwin and Tun Khin have welcomed the NUG's citizenship pledges but say it remains unclear whether a new constitution will recognise Rohingya as an ethnic group. The 2021 statement referred to the 'Rohingya in Rakhine State' rather than affirming indigenous status, drawing earlier criticism. Citizenship promises leave the deeper question of ethnic recognition still open.

8. Diaspora-camp divide

   Diaspora figures dominate the organisational landscape of Rohingya politics, says Ambia Parveen, while camp-based refugees bear the daily risk. Critics argue legitimacy requires sustained consultation with refugees themselves, not social-media launches. Power remains concentrated among diaspora leaders rather than those living in the camps.